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I argue that there are two concepts of distributive justice in play in 
debates on whether principles of distributive justice apply to the global 
sphere. Critics of the idea that the scope of distributive justice is 
restricted assume, without argument, a particular conception of justice 
in which justice-based evaluations apply to basic-structural 
institutional actions only instrumentally, whilst applying intrinsically to 
distributive outcomes for people. I call these outcomes-focused views. I 
show that at least one view in the literature on global justice, the agency 
argument, appeals to a distinct concept of social distributive justice 
where the descriptors ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’, intrinsically apply to the 
actions of certain types of institutional agents, and only derivatively to 
the description of states of affairs such as distributive outcomes. This 
alternative view is treatment-focused and deontological. It focuses on 
special goods that are only available as a matter of how one is treated 
by political institutions: relational-goods. It is also sensitive to 
considerations of fairness in practical reason in ways that outcomes-
focused views are not. I show why, on this agency-focused approach, 
the scope of principles of distributive justice is restricted to how people 
who are subject to special institutional authority are treated. My main 
aim in this paper is to demonstrate that on a competitor approach to 
justice the anti-scope restriction arguments fail, and that the competitor 
approach is not obviously incoherent. Thus criticising scope restriction 
by assuming an outcomes-focused approach to distributive justice begs 
the question against agency-focused arguments. This shows the real 
dispute is at a more fundamental level. 
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Introduction 
Should the concept of distributive justice focus on people’s conditions or on how 
specific agents treat those people? The “agency argument” challenges the idea 
that principles of social distributive justice apply to the relative conditions of 
people across borders as well as within them. This is because, it claims, no 
relevant agent of distributive justice exists with global cross-border reach to 
which principles of distributive social justice could reasonably apply.1 A premise 
of this argument is that social distributive justice is concerned with the 
behaviour of certain kinds of institutional agents—authoritative institutions 
                                                        
* Email: s.meckled-garcia@ucl.ac.uk 
 2 
with powers to assign socially recognised rights and duties to members of a 
political community. I will refer to these as ‘public’ or ‘basic-structural’ 
institutions from now on. For example, the family has a private component—the 
choices, decisions, and attachments that characterise family relations—but also a 
public component in the socially recognised rights and duties used by communal 
institutions to shape familial relationships. One response in the literature to 
arguments for restricting the scope of justice accepts that distributive justice 
might require inherently political or institutional responses to certain 
distributive problems. Yet, the response stresses that the problems themselves 
exist even where the institutions capable of solving them do not. In fact the 
problems call for such justice-realising institutions to be brought about. So, the 
response concludes, descriptors such as “just distribution” and “unjust 
distribution” apply to people’s conditions regardless of current institutions and 
institutional borders. Arguments, such as the agency argument that restrict the 
scope of justice by reference to the need for a basic structure simply confuse the 
institutional remedy for the problem that calls for that remedy.  
 
In this paper I argue that this response is question-begging because it is 
premised on a conception of justice that is itself in contention in the debate. It 
takes certain distributive outcomes to be the basis of characterisations of justice 
and injustice. Institutional actions, on this view, derive their justice or injustice 
from whether they secure or aim at securing these outcomes or whether they fail 
to do so. Institutional actions can remedy unjust circumstances but the 
circumstances are not unjust by reference to the injustice of the actions. It is this 
conception of justice that underpins the response that the concept of distributive 
justice can apply, in the sense of describing certain circumstances as unjust, even 
in the absence of institutions that could change those circumstances (Abizadeh 
2007 p. 333 ff.; Ronzoni 2009 p. 241; Barry & Valentini 2009 p. 498). But the 
strongest version of the agency argument employs a wholly different model of 
justice, one that is agency- or treatment-focused. It characterises distributive 
justice and injustice non-derivatively, as qualities of institutional actions: 
qualities of how a particular kind of institutional agent treats those over whom it 
exercises special rights-generating and duty-imposing powers. If this latter 
concept of justice is coherent and explains why its application should be 
restricted in scope to basic structures, then responses that presuppose a 
different concept of justice beg the question against it. In part I below I show 
how the outcomes-focused concept is at work in prominent objections against 
scope restriction. I set out the alternative concept of justice as a coherent 
alternative in II, before considering the respective merits of these concepts in III, 
where I also argue that relying on the outcomes-focused concept in this debate is 
question begging. 
 
I 
Call the applicability of descriptions such as just and unjust justice aptness from 
now on. Prominent arguments against restricting the scope of the concept of 
distributive justice to basic-structural institutions assume three key premises 
about justice aptness. I will refer to views that imply these premises as 
outcomes-focused approaches. These take the descriptor “distributive injustice” 
to apply to certain circumstances because of the conditions, the outcomes, for 
 3 
people in those circumstances. The justice and injustice of institutional actions 
derive from what they do or aim to do in relation to those conditions. 
 
Derivativeness Premise (DP): justice as a concept only 
derivatively applies to the actions and/or decisions of an 
institutional agency  
 
Instrumental Premise (IP): institutional agencies, such as the basic 
structure of a society, are only instrumental to (even if necessary 
for) implementing justice 
 
The literature on global justice does not explicitly state DP. There are however 
explicit statements of IP, and given that instrumentalism is a way that the justice 
of certain actions can be derived from the justice of a distributive scheme—of a 
set of outcomes—then IP implies DP. 
 
For example, Abizadeh is clear that basic-structural institutions are 
“instrumental” to the achievement of justice (Abizadeh 2007, p. 324, pp. 333-
340). Which is consistent with their being “constitutive” of a just set up in the 
sense of being necessary in establishing a just distribution (p. 329 n. 22 and p. 
330). But given the institutions are not necessary for describing a set up as 
unjust, they are merely feasibility conditions for justice rather than conditions 
for when these concepts apply (Abizadeh 2007, p. 324). All of which only makes 
sense if what is justice apt in a non-derivative way is a set of distributive 
conditions or positions in which people find themselves, the “distribution of 
benefits and burdens” (ibid., 333-34). Institutions may be necessary to remedy 
the absence of such conditions for people; they matter for implementing better 
conditions, but justice aptness is understood fundamentally in terms of those 
conditions. Caney is more explicit: “Would we not want first to determine who 
belongs to a scheme of distributive justice [in Caney’s view all persons]…and 
then [determine]…which political actors can implement this scheme” (Caney 
2008, 496, my emphasis). Which means the justice of what is implemented (the 
scheme) is distinct and prior to institutional implementation. He then goes on to 
elaborate on this “instrumental” role for political institutions (op cit. pp. 510 ff.).2  
 
The relevant conditions to which justice applies non-derivatively can be 
understood in terms of absolute outcomes for each individual person such as 
whether they have access to key conditions needed to enjoy wellbeing or satisfy 
basic needs (Buchanan 1990, pp. 233; 2004, pp. 89 & 134). They can also focus 
on whether or not a pattern of outcomes exists for a group such as equal 
opportunities to access resources, priority access to goods for disadvantaged 
people, or the continuous improvement in the condition of the least advantaged 
(for explicit adoption of patterned outcomes as the non-derivative subject matter 
of justice see: Temkin 1993, p. 19; Murphy 2000 p. 7-8; also Parfit 2002). 
Crucially, justice non-derivatively describes the relevant desirable outcome as a 
goal to be implemented, and injustice describes a range of undesirable 
conditions that do not contain this outcome. Call this the outcomes premise: 
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OP: justice non-derivatively describes a pattern of distribution 
across persons and injustice describes the extent to which this is 
absent in any given circumstance.  
 
Accepting this framework clearly works against the agency argument. That 
argument questions whether the concept of egalitarian distributive social justice 
coherently applies across institutionally separate political communities in the 
absence of a shared institutional agent of distribution. This is because the 
addressee of principles of social distributive justice must be able to assign 
socially recognised rights and duties over a group of people in a fair way. Such an 
agent is not present globally, so a concept corresponding to right and wrong 
actions for this agent cannot be applicable globally. However, appealing to an 
outcomes-focused concept of justice, we could concede the empirical premise 
that there is no such agent globally whilst holding that this fact is itself part of 
the injustice. Undesirable conditions exist that are unfair and institutions are 
conceivable that could address these conditions through redistribution; that 
those institutions are not there to fix the problem is part of the unfairness. This 
holds even if no agent is to blame for imposing or maintaining the current 
conditions. 
 
Some forms of agency can matter non-derivatively on this view, if they are 
incorporated into the relevant outcomes. Some views do this by making the 
actions and choices of people in the scheme part of the distribution and its 
justice or injustice. For example, on some accounts holding people responsible 
for their choices is part of a just pattern of distribution. An extreme form of “luck 
egalitarianism” might require that people suffer disadvantages that are due to 
their own choices. Nevertheless, it is the outcomes—partly defined in terms of 
this kind of agency—that are non-derivatively just or unjust on this view. 
 
However, agency also matters in implementing just schemes. An agent can be 
responsible for acting to redistribute people’s holdings so as to assert the 
relevant distributive pattern. This can be direct, as where public institutions 
have the capacity to impose a distributive pattern. It can also be indirect, as 
where people should support, help reform, or establish institutions best placed 
to do the implementing. Paying fair taxes, for example, is an indirect 
responsibility of justice in this sense. The content of responsibilities of justice is 
defined in terms of the outcomes agents should aim to advance together with 
some account their abilities as implementing agents (Buchanan 1990 p. 231). 
These allocative responsibilities are just because of their relationship to the 
outcomes they aim to achieve. They must reasonably aim at bringing about the 
relevant distributive pattern, directly or indirectly, depending on the agent’s 
capacities. 
 
So, consider Miriam Ronzoni’s argument against institutional scope restriction. 
She holds that it is indeed possible to describe global “background injustice”, 
even in the absence of global basic-structural institutions. This notion of injustice 
is supposedly an extension of Rawls’ view that a basic structure sets conditions 
of background fairness between people by setting social conditions as the 
backdrop of all interpersonal transactions (Rawls 1993 pp. 265 ff.).3 Ronzoni 
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extrapolates that if background fairness for people entering into transactions can 
only exist in the presence of basic-structural institutions that preserve it then 
without these institutions there must exist background unfairness or injustice 
(Ronzoni 2009 pp. 245 ff.). Background fairness on Rawls’ view involves 
institutions adjusting for the effects that even the most innocent transactions 
have on people’s relative positions in a scheme of distribution (Rawls 1993 p. 
267). Innocence here means that by themselves the transactions do not directly 
wrong anyone, nor are they complicit with actions that do. Disparities between 
people’s life chances will arise through the accumulated but unintended effects 
of individual actions without anyone being individually at fault. Public 
institutions that could adjust background terms to correct for this yet permit it 
can hardly be said to show equal concern for the lives of those they govern. 
However, for Ronzoni the absence of institutions contributes to the unfair 
circumstances and so it is part of the unfairness people suffer (op cit., p. 236). 
Background fairness in the Rawlsian account from which this terminology is 
taken does not apply to individual actions, so by implication the actions of 
individuals involved in transactions are not unfair or unjust. “Background 
injustice” must instead describe undesirable conditions—outcomes—and are 
sometimes due to the absence of an agency that might correct for those 
conditions. 
 
There are other examples of this kind of instrumentalist reasoning separating 
the notion of justice (or injustice) from specific institutional behaviour (Follesdal 
2011 p. 48; Gilabert 2011 pp. 585 & 591). Theorists appeal to general 
responsibilities for all of us to “promote global egalitarian goals” [my emphasis] 
(Barry & Valentini, 2009, pp. 497, 498) and assert that globally “we should aim at 
equalizing life prospects” (Gilabert 2011 p. 585) or that “we” have imperfect 
duties of justice to work towards some better global outcome (Ronzoni 2009 p. 
240 and n. 31). The clear implication is that justice and injustice at core define 
patterns of distribution. “We” can make indirect contributions that are just in a 
derivative, instrumental sense toward achieving these outcomes, and special 
institutions can act to directly implement a distributive pattern, but the justice of 
these actions is still instrumental, deriving from the justice of the outcomes. 
 
On these views, indirect instrumental responsibilities can also be used to fill the 
agency gap between a world without an agent capable of direct implementation 
and one in which such an agent is present. The responsibilities lie with people 
(the “we”) to work to bring about the relevant just distribution-implementing 
institutions (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 86-87). If people fail to work to establish such 
institutions, they might be said to behave unjustly by their omissions but not in 
the direct sense of either putting into place an unjust order or in the sense of 
failing to directly implement a just distribution where they can. The 
responsibility to work towards establishing background institutions capable of 
implementing background justice is inevitably an imperfect duty on this view 
(Ronzoni, 2009, pp. 240-41 n. 31; Gilabert 2012 p. 17). 
 
However, this (teleological) understanding of justice is not the only available 
view.4 On a plausible alternative, the concepts of distributive justice and injustice 
non-derivatively apply to the actions of institutional agents rather than outcomes. 
 6 
In the absence of those agents and so of actions that can be just or unjust, these 
concepts do not apply. If that conception of justice favours scope-restricting 
arguments then objections premised on an outcomes-focused approach beg an 
important question against those arguments. I now set out this alternative 
conception of justice. 
 
II 
This turns on the notion of treatment: whether institutions treat people rightly 
or wrongly. If distributive injustice means an agent acting (or failing to act) in a 
way that mistreats people over whom it has special distributive powers, then in 
the absence of such mistreatment there is no distributive injustice. Even if there 
is a distribution that is in some sense undesirable, that is not sufficient for social 
distributive injustice and the mere existence, were that possible without agency, 
of a correspondingly desirable distributive pattern is not sufficient for 
distributive justice (Cf. Anderson 2013 p. 10). 
 
With special powers come special responsibilities and basic structural 
institutions have a special power. This is the exercise of political authority in 
assigning socially recognised rights and duties over specific groups of persons 
(Rawls 1971 pp. 6 & 7, 1993 pp. 108-9, 262 ff., and 264-5; Freeman 2006 & 2013 
p. 206; Meckled-Garcia 2008 pp. 252 & 256-8;). Where institutions have 
legitimate authority in a political community (I will come to what legitimacy 
means below), they assign people rights by processes and decisions that are 
authoritative for that community. This is done through legislation, judicial and 
quasi-judicial decision-making, and political directives, including directives by 
bodies with delegated powers. Rights and duties thus assigned to people, where 
they are legitimately assigned, require that all members of society recognise 
them and where relevant incorporate them into their practical reasoning. For 
example, for Jay to enjoy legal property rights over certain resources will require 
that others recognise Jay’s claims over those resources and observe specific 
duties to respect those claims. They will bear burdens in the form of direct costs 
should they wish to acquire property that is owned by Jay and the opportunity 
costs of respecting her exclusivity rights over the property. They must take those 
rights into account in forming their own life plans. In this way institutions set 
terms of engagement for people’s interactions where some are required to take 
on burdens that collectively generate benefits for others. 
 
In arranging social rights and duties these institutions distribute special kinds of 
goods and costs. They establish special cooperative relationships and so the 
goods they assign are inherently cooperative: they would not result from others’ 
burdens were it not for this form of cooperation. For example, that Jay enjoys 
benefits from a particular configuration of property rights is due to being placed 
in a cooperative relationship with people like Kay who carry the burdens 
necessary for upholding those rights. This means some people carry special 
burdens for the sake of others enjoying special social benefits in the form of 
rights. Call these types normative arrangements of burdens-for-the-sake-of-
benefits relational goods. Such goods are not available unless institutions 
establish one or other arrangement of rights and duties. Distributing relational 
goods then, is not like allocating commodities or possessions to people, such as 
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resources that satisfy needs; it is the arranging of cooperative relationships. This 
kind of distribution is inherently cooperative rather than “allocative” (Rawls 
2001 p. 50). 
 
Because arrangements of relational goods have two sides to them comprising 
both the benefit enjoyed and the burdens shouldered, one cannot evaluate their 
distribution without evaluating the kind of cooperation they establish (given the 
alternative cooperative arrangements available). In determining what is a fair 
distribution of property rights, for example, one cannot simply consider the 
benefits these rights imply for the holder; one must consider whether it is fair to 
impose the corresponding burdens for the sake of the benefits in this particular 
arrangement. One must decide which arrangements show equal concern to all. In 
an order with public institutions there must be one or other arrangement of 
rights and duties—there is no institutional order without an arrangement of 
relational goods. So institutions act fairly by choosing a fair arrangement out of 
the possible arrangements. The relevant question here, then, is which 
cooperative arrangement it is fair to impose out of those that are possible. It is 
not, as it is in an outcomes-focused approach, what distribution is desirable 
regardless of cooperation.  
 
Consider the proposal that we evaluate these arrangements simply in terms of 
how goods and costs are distributed, as a distributive pattern of opportunities, 
resources, conditions of wellbeing, or capability sets—what we might call a bare 
distribution. The problem with applying this standard to relational goods is that 
it misses the cooperative element of the relationships established between those 
subject to such an arrangement. It does not explain why Kay in particular should 
bear the burdens she does for the sake of Jay. That she contributes and what she 
contributes to the scheme would only be relevant from the perspective of a bare 
distribution if it affects the distributive pattern. On that approach, Kay has no 
special status as a co-operator. 
 
From the point of view of institutions showing equal concern to those on whom 
they impose cooperative arrangements she does have special claims. Those 
institutions must show her equal concern as a co-operator, rather than as a 
resource to be managed in achieving a distributive pattern. That means, for 
example, she should not be expected to adopt a conception of her personal good 
that makes it a life priority for her to pursue a certain social distributive pattern. 
That would be to treat her life choices and commitments as instrumental 
towards distributive patterning. Institutions can instead adopt arrangements of 
rights and duties that simultaneously allow her to pursue her chosen life 
priorities where doing so contributes to other co-operators being able to do the 
same. They can make her pursuit and obtaining of socially available resources to 
advance her goals conditional on this benefitting others, and she can pursue 
those priorities to the extent that it does so. There is no requirement here that 
she adopts or pursues any particular priority and to any particular extent, other 
than what is necessary to cooperate with the social rights and duties that 
establish these conditions. This means individuals do not contribute by quota but 
by being permitted to pursue their own ends in a way that pays social dividends. 
Individual co-operators act fairly in so far as they cooperate with fair 
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institutional arrangements or support fair arrangements being selected by 
institutions. An outcomes-focused approach, on the other hand, would require 
that individuals contribute whatever institutions need in implementing a pattern 
of distribution. If this meant individuals altering their personal life goals, giving 
up pursuing life aims for the sake of contributing to the distributive pattern, 
from an outcomes perspective there is nothing to rule this out. Thus the two 
perspectives on evaluating institutional arrangements have different upshots. 
 
I should underline that on this view fairness is not about receiving reciprocation 
according to one’s contribution to a cooperative surplus (Cf. Buchanan 1990 p. 
230; Lister 2013 p. 93). Rather it is each person being treated with equal concern 
in the arrangement of social rights and duties by basic structural institutions 
representing the political community as a whole. Reciprocating with such a 
structure means essentially accepting one’s socially assigned duties and so 
upholding fairness.5 That is why even net non-contributors reciprocate, in so far 
as they uphold fair social right and duty arrangements. So, reciprocity here does 
not merely mean submitting to social rules where we have benefitted from 
others similarly submitting. That would be compatible with quite meagre 
benefits for some co-operators (Lister 2013 pp. 83-84). That is a particular 
problem for views that model justice on direct interpersonal reciprocity.6 
Fairness here governs institutional decisions and how they configure social 
cooperation; it requires that those institutions treat people over whom they can 
establish such arrangements fairly by configuring the arrangements in a way 
that shows them equal concern. Participants cannot individually decide the 
terms of this cooperation or agree it on a case-by-case basis, yet it constrains the 
extent to which they can pursue their chosen life aims. Cooperative institutions, 
however, can choose between different cooperative arrangements, and so are 
responsible for acting with equal concern for the lives of those they place in 
these cooperative relations. 
 
This same question of fairness in the arrangement of relational goods does not 
exist between people directly. In the absence of such arrangements Jay and Kay 
might never interact. Even if they could interact, they cannot arrange 
opportunities for each other in the form of recognised rights linked with burdens 
that make such rights possible. People involved in direct interactions might rely 
on understood conventions about property or about agreements, for example, 
but they cannot decide the terms of these conventions ex nihil with each 
transaction. This is because any decision or agreement two people make about 
property does not have authority for how all others should understand the 
nature and limits of property rights, and so the benefits and burdens they imply. 
Transacting parties cannot, then, set background conditions against which 
everyone transacts or select between alternative cooperative arrangements of 
relational goods. Which means individuals cannot, in their position of co-
operators pursuing their own life goals, show equal concern for each other’s 
lives; they cannot directly treat each other fairly or unfairly in terms of an 
arrangement of relational goods. This contrasts with the cooperative 
relationship between members of a political community, which is “mediated” by 
institutions capable of distributing relational goods. The focus of distributive 
justice is institutions deciding between such arrangements, rather than 
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individuals’ direct treatment of each other. Individual actions connect with the 
value of equal concern only in so far as they support institutional agents in acting 
fairly. 
 
The above is compatible with there being ways people can interact that are right 
or wrong regardless of the presence of mediating institutions. Unjustifiably 
harming others is a moral wrong, as is failing to rescue them under specific 
circumstances, even in the absence of mediating institutions.7 But these are not 
cases of social cooperation involving relational goods. Whether someone makes 
a fair cooperative contribution is not relevant to whether I should rescue her 
from dire straits if I can do so at a reasonable burden. There is no morally 
distinctive role in such matters for a special agent that arranges cooperative 
enterprises, and the way institutions arrange rights and duties for cooperation is 
not a special object of this kind of justice. The relevant values here are not 
distinctively cooperative (Meckled-Garcia 2013 pp. 77 ff.). 
 
The treatment-focused view is also compatible with there being a separate 
standard of transactional fairness. That is the sense of “fair dealing” that rules out 
dishonesty, deceit, subterfuge, manipulation, duress, and other forms of 
disrespect for persons when engaging in voluntary transactions. It is a standard 
that applies directly between transacting agents and so does not apply especially 
to the mediating actions of institutions. In fair dealing agents pursue ends each 
has prior to a fair transaction and the question is how each should pursue her 
ends in a way that respects the other. Fair social cooperative institutions, on the 
other hand, should not have an end that is distinct from showing equal concern 
for people who are pursuing their ends in the context of social cooperation. The 
fairness of fair dealing, then, is distinct from social distributive fairness (Rawls 
1971 p. 7; Barry 1982 p. 227). 
 
In sum, then, on the treatment-focused view social distributive justice or fairness 
is a special form of evaluation in which only the actions of a certain kind of agent 
are justice-apt. It is the special powers of that agent in deciding between 
alternative cooperative arrangements of rights and duties that calls for this 
distinctive form of evaluation. The power to establish such arrangements is 
inherently cooperative, and so the moral importance of those arrangements is 
not adequately understood as the desirability of a bare distribution. In the 
absence of the relevant institutional agency an evaluation of social cooperative 
fairness, on this approach, has nothing to which it might apply. So the notions of 
“background injustice” or social unfairness (Ronzoni ibid; Abizadeh 2007 p. 333) 
do not apply in such circumstances. This is also relevant to the scope of 
distributive justice in that cooperative fairness is fairness to those for whom 
cooperation is arranged in the form of social rights and duties by institutions 
that legitimately exercise this power over them. So, the claim that we can identify 
“background injustice” in the very absence of basic-structural institutions must 
be based on a different concept of justice to this one. 
 
I have so far only sketched this concept of social distributive justice to show it is 
at least a coherent alternative. Before comparing its cogency to the outcomes-
focused approach I should address the possible objection that even if the 
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alternative concept of justice is the right one, I am nevertheless wrong about its 
scope because duties of distributive justice might still exist in the absence of 
cooperation-arranging institutions. This is in the indirect sense that people have 
duties to create these institutions.  
 
The response only works if people already have a duty based in instrumental 
reasons to establish relational goods. The justification for that would have to be 
that the existence of relational goods is better than not having relational goods, 
or even that having a fair distribution of relational goods is better than having no 
relational goods. But that is an outcomes-focused form of reasoning. On the 
notion of societal fairness I have just sketched, the fairness question is not 
whether an arrangement of relational goods exists but rather whether 
institutions capable of choosing between alternative cooperative arrangements 
impose fair or unfair cooperation. One cannot use the fairness of cooperation to 
compare a prospective cooperative arrangement with the absence of any 
cooperative arrangement. At least one cannot do that unless one reduces fairness 
and unfairness to a set of outcomes rather than types of institutionally arranged 
cooperation. Recall that relational goods are relations established between 
people by institutions: benefits for individuals, through assigning them socially 
recognised rights, linked to burdens for others that make those rights possible. 
So, the existence of a relational good is not a moral good unless institutions act 
fairly in imposing a burden-for-the sake-of-benefit relationship on those they 
legitimately govern. The absence of a relational good is only a moral bad if these 
institutions act unfairly towards those they govern by failing to impose that 
burden-benefit relationship on them. Consequently, any proposal to create 
cooperative institutions that do not yet exist cannot be based in considerations 
of this kind of fairness or unfairness; in such cases there just is no agent to act 
fairly or unfairly in this way. If, alternatively, the proposed basis for shared 
institutions is to bring about a certain pattern of distribution, an outcome, then 
this objection simply presupposes the outcomes-focused approach. Such an 
approach cannot be introduced as an assumption in an argument for modifying 
or rejecting the coherence of an otherwise coherent competitor view. 
 
Under certain circumstances other moral reasons for establishing collective 
institutions can of course apply. The need to resolve dangerous disputes, secure 
peace, or opportunities to engage in reasonable rescue might furnish reasons for 
shared institutions. But these are not reasons based in social fairness or 
unfairness. People’s conditions in those circumstances are not just or unjust in 
the distribution of relational goods as no agent in those circumstances is in a 
position to arrange such goods fairly or unfairly for all by assigning social 
cooperative rights and duties. Furthermore, for some of these reasons to 
consociate under collective institutions the responsibilities they generate will be 
imperfect; they allow agents a significant degree of judgement as to how to 
incorporate and prioritise these goals, given their other legitimate goals, and do 
not therefore ground a duty to consociate. 
 
Consider the general duty to assist others in need. Unlike the specific duty of 
rescue, this is a general end that individuals need to use their judgement to 
operationalise. They must balance it against other ends and judge how to 
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prioritise it given all their legitimate personal commitments, attachments, 
relationships, and projects. Political communities too, can and should 
incorporate the end of assisting others in dire straits, but must balance that 
against the legitimate goal of arranging fair cooperative relations for those 
whose social rights and duties they legitimately configure. Under certain 
conditions assistance can take the form of entering into institutional association 
with others, either by creating new shared institutions or by extending 
membership of an existing institutional order to them. But whether they should 
do this is not a question of cooperative fairness but of imperfect duties of 
assistance and the judgement they entail. 
 
One might object that the very existence of borders imposes duties on everyone 
outside a political community. But this is a somewhat different sense of duties. 
The duties imposed are not premised on the authority to establish on-going 
cooperative arrangements between those on one side of a border and those on 
the other—states cannot levy taxes or arrange property relations for those 
outside their borders. What the correct terms should be for imposing border 
duties is a moral question and the answer may be quite demanding (at least 
more demanding than currently accepted) for states. However that is a different 
question from the fair way for public institutions to use their authority to 
arrange social cooperation fairly. On an outcomes-focused approach, of course, 
there is no distinction in principle between the morality of borders and 
distributive justice. 
 
What is agency? 
So far I have only sought to distinguish a treatment-focused approach to 
distributive justice from one that focuses on outcomes. Before considering their 
respective merits, I will address two important worries. The first concerns the 
notion of institutional agency to which I have referred throughout and the 
second the notion of legitimacy. On the first, one might see a problem in the 
treatment view appealing to an untenable conception of agency. The agency of 
institutions is at best metaphorical, given that institutions are made up of 
individuals whose choices and actions produce the institutional “actions and 
decisions” that are the focus of evaluation on this approach. If agency reduces to 
the former individual behaviour, then the concept of distributive justice does not 
apply to the actions of a special mediating agent; it simply applies to the actions 
of individuals. 
 
The notion of institutional agency I employ is the mundane sense in which we 
say that a government mistreats its citizens, or that a state can be repressive. 
That is the sense in which collective bodies, with their special processes and 
command structures, make collective decisions affecting people’s rights and 
duties. So, for example tax burdens are socially recognised duties for citizens and 
legally protected access to school places are socially recognised rights. In each 
case we are aware of the kind of decisions giving rise to these and the 
mechanisms for adjudicating and enforcing them, such as the courts. The 
political and judicial institutions of a society are empowered to make these 
decisions, and the people who make up the institutions are empowered to do so 
only in their official capacities, within limits set by their mandates. Legislatures 
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and Judges decide on the rights and duties that are socially recognised, not 
individuals in those positions acting in a personal capacity. Of course, to have 
such powers in any acceptable sense means having legitimate authority and I 
come to that, below. But having them means deciding for the political 
community. Arrangements of relational goods are thus how a political 
community decides they way its members should cooperate—it is a relationship 
of treatment of individuals by their fellow co-operators acting collectively. If 
institutions can be accountable for these kinds of decisions, then they can be said 
to treat people in a better or worse way in the relevant sense. 
 
Legitimacy 
One objection against restricting the scope of justice to basic-structural 
institutions on the basis of social cooperation is only fair cooperation can be 
genuine cooperation (Abizadeh 2007 p 330 ff.).8 The agency argument and the 
treatment account of justice on which it is based, presuppose genuine, which is 
to say legitimate, social cooperation. I have so far bracketed the question of 
legitimacy, but this objection requires that I address it. 
 
The conception of justice I have set out only presupposes fairness if we make the 
legitimacy of cooperative institutions—their authority to arrange the terms of 
social cooperation—depend on their fairness. Yet, it is a plausible view that 
public institutions can have the authority to assign socially recognised rights and 
duties to their members in ways that fall short of full distributive fairness. 
Institutions might acquire legitimacy to act by protecting fundamental human 
rights, the rule of law, upholding political participation mechanisms for citizens, 
and some guarantee that institutions will rectify productive relations or a lack of 
resources that impedes citizen participation in these arrangements yet be wrong 
on the content of distributive fairness.9 This position is not unknown in the 
literature. Rawls holds it at least for international legitimacy, which is to say 
acceptance into the community of states in good standing (Rawls 1971, 5-7, 1992 
pp. 65-66, 1993 pp. 262 ff.). Dworkin too put forward such a view (Dworkin 
2011 pp. 335 ff.), and others have articulated standards of legitimacy that do not 
require full distributive justice (Cohen 2006 pp. 226 ff., 2004 p. 213; Beitz 2009 
p. 183). 
 
Where political communities trying to arrive at a fair arrangement get it wrong, 
it seems plausible to say that they can get it wrong in a reasonable way. Showing 
equal respect for citizens as members and participators in cooperative 
arrangements would seem a reasonable basis for legitimate social authority that 
is distinct from the basis of social fairness.10 Legitimacy here represents the 
distinct value of a political community trying to collectively get it right about 
fairness in arranging its cooperative relationships. Without political authority 
prefiguring their arrival at the right answer, a community cannot even begin to 
work collectively towards discovering that answer. The reasonable limits on 
trying to do so are limits on what counts as a genuine collective aim. The 
conditions listed above are at least prima facie evidence that the political 
community does not reject these institutions given that guaranteed basic rights 
would allow movements towards change. Institutions that fail these tests and yet 
try to impose arrangements are not unjust because they are unfair – they have 
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no business even trying to arrange social cooperation at all. If this view is 
plausible, then legitimacy is a necessary condition for distributive justice rather 
than the other way round. 
 
III 
 
If the above account of the role of distributive justice is coherent, two questions 
remain. Firstly, does adopting it necessarily rule out the outcomes-focused or 
instrumental approach for institutions? Secondly, is there even a preliminary 
argument for preferring it to an outcomes-focused approach? I answer both 
these question below. 
 
Firstly, even if institutions can be evaluated in terms of their cooperative 
qualities, why should we not also evaluate them on the basis of outcomes? Above 
I argued that the cooperative component of these institutions is not adequately 
evaluated in terms of outcomes, but the question here is whether outcomes 
might be an additional form of evaluation. For this to underpin an account of 
global distributive justice, the relevant outcomes at which institutions must aim 
would have to be global. But the problem here is the value underpinning fairness 
in exercising the power to establish social cooperative arrangements. That is the 
value of agents showing equal concern for those over whom they configure 
social-cooperative arrangements. Using institutions for a different purpose 
means turning cooperation to serve a different imperative than equal concern 
for people as co-operators, which means moving away from equal concern for 
people as social co-operators. 
 
So consider a proposal to arrange social rights and duties in a political 
community with the aim of contributing towards producing a certain distributive 
pattern globally, say a global minimum wellbeing level. States could do this by 
imposing duties on everyone to adopt and prioritise personal life aims that will 
contribute optimally to improving global wellbeing levels and by taxing everyone 
until they are at the minimum wellbeing level whilst globally redistributing the 
tax revenue. From the perspective of societal cooperation, such institutional acts 
treat co-operators unfairly. The institutions do not show equal concern for 
people subject to their authority as co-operators tied together by cooperative 
relationships. Instead they impose burdens on them that serve a different goal. 
Imposing these burdens treats them as instruments in achieving that goal by 
requiring they adopt certain life choices and refusing them the option of 
pursuing resources towards advancing their own life choices in a way that is fair 
on their cooperating fellow citizens. For example, cooperative arrangements by 
public institutions aimed improving the condition of the worst off cooperating 
members beyond minimum wellbeing will clash with measures to improve 
global wellbeing levels by re-allocating resources. Cooperative fairness, on the 
other hand, would allow individuals to choose their own priorities and pursue 
them in ways that are beneficial to co-operating citizens that cannot pursue their 
own with the same success. This notion of fairness, then, is incompatible with 
adopting an outcomes-focused conception of justice as an institutional principle. 
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The same problem arises if one tries to convert or systematise the imperfect 
duties of assistance of each co-operator into a more efficient way of achieving a 
specific global goal. To be consistent with fair treatment in cooperation the 
imperfect duties would have to apply to the time, resources, and effort left to us 
after the demands of fair cooperation had been imposed. But this only connects 
practically with a definite outcome if we interpret imperfect duties as implying a 
specific quota of contribution to global outcomes. That “quota” interpretation of 
imperfect duties clashes with practical fairness. In tying contribution to a specific 
goal it would require that individuals adopt this as a priority, in adopting and 
prioritising life projects say, rather than allowing people to pursue their chosen 
life goals in a way that is consistent with social cooperation. The imperative to 
work towards a quota of contribution is not inherently sensitive to people being 
able to pursue their chosen life goals given there is nothing in the global goal that 
restricts its demands to where people might be said to be free to prioritise their 
pursuit of personal goals. A more plausible interpretation of both individual and 
collective imperfect duties is as duties to adopt an end or value, such as assisting 
others, and to exercise judgement as to how that is best balanced with personal 
ends and priorities and with the imperatives of cooperative fairness respectively. 
A society can legitimately decide to assign some resources to assist other 
societies if this does not detract fundamentally from fairness. It can even decide 
to make contributions that imply a temporary deviation working towards fairer 
cooperation, under special circumstances, because all things considered it judges 
that to be right. What it cannot do is adopt a general maxim to deviate from 
fairness, which is what an outcomes-directed imperative seems to require 
(though what it actually requires is unclear, see below). 
 
So, given that outcomes-focused and treatment-focused accounts are not 
compatible imperatives for basic structural institutions is there any reason to 
prefer either as a master principle? One advantage of the treatment-focused view 
lies in that it provides a clear account of fair practical reasons. Any account of 
justice will require some account of which burdens should reasonably and 
justifiably correspond to the production of which benefits. In a treatment-
focused account the value of institutions showing equal concern in arranging 
cooperation can explain principles that adjudicate both burdens and benefits in 
relation to each other. Outcomes-focused views, on the other hand, begin from 
the value of outcomes and must then provide an additional account of what 
should be done to implement them and by whom. 
 
Such an approach will evaluate choices, relationships, and pursuits on whether 
these serve the production of the relevant distributive pattern. But the sacrifice 
of personal choices and the pursuit of personal goals that is given up to 
contribute towards this end is a troubling question for any such view. Obviously, 
burden is limited by possibility or ‘ought implies can’. But beyond that, to give 
justice some content in practical reason, the view must set out and justify a level 
of sacrifice people must make towards producing the global pattern. Even within 
the constraint of ought implies can, for any genuine and lasting distributive 
pattern, achieving the goal will require people abandon non-productive personal 
life goals and adopt productive ones. I take that to be sufficient to render that 
upshot in practical reason implausible. What the view would need, then, is an 
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account of when it is reasonable to expect a person to sacrifice any of her life 
commitments, attachments, plans, and priorities, for the sake of bettering the 
conditions of others. Without that, the view is not about what actions are owed 
to anyone rather than the desirability of some states of affairs considered in 
distinction from what should be done to bring them about. We have, as I have set 
out, some sense of the practical reasons that apply to cooperative institutions. 
We also have a sense of required action in easy rescue situations. However, 
neither of those standards supplies a plausible general principle for what is a 
reasonable sacrifice towards establishing a global pattern of distribution. 
 
Imperfect duties to incorporate the end of assisting others in our goals do not 
face this fair practical reasons problem because incorporation means exercising 
judgement as to how to balance this end with our key life commitments. 
However, there are a myriad of ways we can assisting others in need, from 
helping an elderly person in distress in our neighbourhood, to volunteering on a 
suicide helpline, to representing colleagues in trade union disputes, as well as 
contributing towards whatever project we judge to potentially make a difference 
to development. Unless there is an argument for reducing that notion of an 
imperfect duty to assist others to a single goal and giving this priority over 
others, it is unclear that imperfect duties suitably connect with actually achieving 
any global distributive pattern. 
 
So, for outcomes views to be plausible they need an account of fairness in 
practical reasons. For every personal commitment or attachment, friendship or 
project, that one might have to give up in order to work for the global end we 
would need some kind of principle that tells us if the sacrifice is morally justified 
for the contributor and why. Which is to say we need an account of practical 
reasons incorporating both a justification of the burdens supplied and the 
benefits achieved simultaneously. Characteristics of patterns of distribution as a 
goal may explain what might be desirable about it as an outcome in abstraction 
from the burdens needed to bring them about but that does not tell us what 
counts as a reasonable route to achieving these goals. The cooperative and 
relational conception of fairness, by contrast, can explain fair burdens as fair 
treatment: where public institutions arrange social rights and duties in a way 
that shows equal concern to people as co-operators pursuing distinct life 
priorities by allowing them to pursue those priorities in a way that contributes 
to the social cooperative endeavour. Given that outcomes-focused views lack a 
plausible account of how fairness in practical reasons connects with achieving 
distributive outcomes, their only alternative seems to be a notion of practical 
reason that does not take seriously people’s pursuit of distinct life goals. Without 
a plausible account of fairness in practical reason it is difficult to say how a view 
is genuinely a moral view of justice as opposed to, say, an account of something 
that is valuable in the abstraction from its costs. 
 
One might attempt to get round this problem by proposing that people have 
duties to create institutions that in turn will treat people justly by coordinating 
action to achieve the desired outcomes. One might think there are imperfect 
duties towards this end, such as the obligation to “perfect” one’s imperfect duties 
(e.g., Tan 2004 p. 52 among others; see discussion at Meckled-Garcia 2013 pp. 81 
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ff.). Some theorists have tried to connect an outcomes-focused approach with 
Rawls’ idea of natural duties of justice (Ronzoni op cit. p. 240 n. 31; Gilabert 2012 
pp. 139-40). These include the duty to work to establish just arrangements 
where they do not yet exist. I will not here address the question of whether 
Rawls’ view applies outside the context of institutional relations and an 
institutional agent that arranges them, though I think there are good reasons to 
see Rawls’ view of natural duties of justice, as opposed to the other natural 
duties, as institutionally confined, given he always refers to this in relation to just 
arrangements rather than just institutions or societies (Cf. James 2005 pp.92-93). 
 
However, as I noted above, imperfect duties plausibly involve many and varied 
ways in which we can assist others and contribute to adopted ends. That very 
variety together with the legitimacy of pursuing our own aims and attachments 
means that we must exercise judgement as to how to balance these goals in our 
lives, and so as to how much to contribute to different ends. There is no right 
amount for all to contribute, only different reasonable amounts for each given a 
genuine commitment to each of those ends. This severs any necessary 
connection in practical reason between what one aims to do in line with duty and 
any specific set of global outcomes. People could potentially reasonably ‘do 
something’ to assist those in need without that resulting in any systematic global 
change, at least not in any near future. If justice is supposed to be about 
outcomes for specific people such as those alive now, as opposed to some 
abstract ideal for distribution without a timeframe or account of practical 
reasons to get us there, then this view is not an adequate account of justice. Not 
only that, the matter is complicated by how people should balance aims at global 
reform with legitimate social cooperation with others (assuming the view does 
not reject the fairness-legitimacy distinction). In the absence of clear answers in 
practical reason to what constitutes people’s fair quota of action that will 
genuinely effect global change, the idea that acting one way or another 
constitutes an injustice seems to lose its edge. 
 
The above does not rule out global duties for states. For example duties to adopt 
standards of global fairness in the sense of fair play, respecting human rights in 
the sense of rejecting policy formulations that fail to show equal respect (as 
opposed to equal concern) to people, or collaborations that improve efficiency in 
assisting societies in dire straits. It also does not rule out seeking agreements 
and collaborations that collectively secure public goods like protecting the 
environment. Similarly, states have obligations to rescue people fleeing 
persecution and duties to better organise migration policies. One can even accept 
the Kantian idea that in certain circumstances of friction between individuals or 
communities, there are good reasons to consociate under shared institutions 
that resolve disputes. But none of these necessarily connect with the idea of 
justice as aiming at a global distributive pattern. Nor do they focus on 
institutions capable of equal concern in the sense I have described it: a capacity 
of institutions that can legitimately configure cooperative arrangements of rights 
and duties between individual persons. Given the nature of international 
institutions, which does not involve legitimately imposing rights and duties on 
individuals, other moral standards apply to the specific moral problems facing 
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those institutions, standards compatible with adopting a treatment-focused 
conception of distributive justice and its scope. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that there are two distinct accounts of distributive justice in play in 
the debate about the scope of justice. I have also argued that the treatment-
focused conception of justice underpins at least some scope-restricting views 
and is as plausible as the outcomes-focused view assumed by critics of scope 
restriction. To put this in the vocabulary of moral value theory, the critics 
challenge non-teleological views of distributive justice on the basis of a 
teleological assumption. As the very concept of justice is a contentious point in 
the debate, appealing to a partisan conception in objecting to one’s opponents is 
question begging. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 Viz. the claim that without a justified agent a principle is incomplete in the way 
that “a sentence without a grammatical subject is incomplete” (Meckled-Garcia 
2013 p. 111; Barry & Valentini 2009 p. 496; Meckled-Garcia, 2008). 
2 “Consider a world with two separate systems of interaction that have no 
contact but are aware of each other and suppose that one of them is prosperous 
whereas the other extremely impoverished. Compare, now, two individuals [one 
from each system] who are identical in their abilities and needs. The member of 
the prosperous system receives more. But it is difficult to see why—
concentrating on any possible and reasonable criteria for entitlement—this is 
fair.” (Caney 2005, p. 111). Fairness (justice) here focuses on the state of affairs 
(outcome) of differential prosperity. Institutional actions that attempt to rectify 
such differentials would derive their justice or injustice from the justice/injustice 
of the distributive states of affairs they sought to bring about. 
3 Rawls never even mentions the possibility of non-basic structural background 
injustice, and in discussing the erosion of background fairness he clearly refers 
to this only in the context of “social circumstances” that “may be fair at an earlier 
time” for “citizens’ relationships” (Rawls 1993 p. 266). 
4 I call it teleological because the view makes attributions of justice and injustice 
turn on the value and disvalue of outcomes, respectively, and actions are just or 
unjust in relation to these aims (teloi). I do not go as far as describing the view as 
“consequentialist” (viz. Anderson 2013 p. 2) because consequentialism implies a 
specific decision procedure for generating practical reasons and I am not sure 
the outcomes-focused approaches I have described have a clear account of 
corresponding practical reasons. 
5 Note that here I accept a distinction between right to rule (legitimacy) and 
individuals’ duties to contribute grounded in reciprocity with the political 
community. 
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6 Compare this to views that model distributive justice on direct interpersonal 
reciprocity (Sangiovanni 2007 p. 26), assured interpersonal reciprocity (Lister 
2013 p. 87 ff.), or direct interpersonal cooperation (Quong 2011 p. 81).  
7 Which specific circumstances trigger rescue duties is also a matter of 
contention. Authors holding outcomes views tend to see the triggers as people 
being in serious need plus our ability to help and then add disclaimers that the 
costs of rescue should not be excessive (Buchanan 2004, n. 11 p. 248). They do 
not distinguish the basis for rescue from that for distributive justice. Less 
outcomes-focused theorists see the triggers for rescue as involving distinctive 
features, such as “proximity” to, or “confrontation” with the plight of specific 
individuals (viz. Miller, 2010 pp. 23 ff.; Kamm, 2007 p. 379; Dworkin 2011, pp. 
277 ff.), which would distinguish rescue from distributive justice. 
8 Abizadeh claims that for Rawls the idea of social cooperation “includes the idea 
of fair terms of cooperation” (Abizadeh 2007 p. 329). However, if “includes” is 
supposed to mean “presupposes,” I have been unable to find any equivalent 
reference in A Theory of Justice, which is the text to which Abizadeh refers. 
9 Legitimacy does not necessarily require a fully democratic order on these views 
(Meckled-Garcia 2014). 
10 Note that this view can answer the objection that all those affected by a 
political decision should participate democratically in making it for the decision 
to be legitimate (Abizadeh 2010 p. 121). This view of legitimacy concerns the 
right to configure ongoing cooperation rather than merely affecting others, so 
long as equal respect is shown to all, which means basic rights are respected. 
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